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 The Giovanni family and the Palmer family live in 
neighborhoods close to contaminated federal facilities that 
were owned and operated for decades by the United States 
Navy.  The families filed separate suits in state court under 
the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (“HSCA”), 35 
Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 6020.101-.1305, seeking orders requiring 
the Navy to pay for medical monitoring and to conduct a 
health assessment or health effects study that would include 
blood testing for themselves and others exposed to the 
hazardous substances released at the contaminated facilities.  
The Navy removed the cases to the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which 
concluded that the claims fell within the ambit of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA” or “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675, and were challenges under that Act to ongoing cleanup 
efforts at the facilities.  Based on that, the Court further 
decided that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
cases and dismissed them.  The Giovannis and Palmers now 
appeal those orders of dismissal.  
 
We will affirm in part.  In our view, the claim for a 
health assessment or health effects study is barred, as the 
District Court said, because it challenges ongoing cleanup 
efforts.  But we will vacate and remand in part because we 
conclude that the medical monitoring claim is not a challenge 
under CERCLA and that it is not barred by sovereign 
immunity. 
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I. BACKGROUND FACTS1 
 
The Navy owns a number of properties in 
Pennsylvania, including the Willow Grove Naval Air and Air 
Reserve Station in Horsham Township and the Naval Air 
Development Center in Warminster Township (collectively, 
“the Naval Facilities”).  Because of the Navy’s activities, both 
facilities are contaminated with hazardous substances.  
Among the contaminants are perfluorinated compounds 
(“PFCs”), including perfluorooctanoic acid (“PFOA”) and 
perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (“PFOS”).   
 
Studies have identified the toxic effects that PFCs have 
on people, including increased risk of kidney cancer, 
testicular cancer, thyroid disease, ulcerative colitis, 
pregnancy-induced hypertension, and high cholesterol.  And 
                                              
1  The parties do not dispute any material facts bearing 
on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, which makes the 
Navy’s attack on the complaints under Rule 12(b)(1) a facial 
challenge rather than a factual one.  See Hartig Drug Co. Inc. 
v. Senju Pharm. Co. Ltd., 836 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(“A facial 12(b)(1) challenge … attacks the complaint on its 
face without contesting its alleged facts[.]”).  Thus, because 
we address a facial challenge, the facts set forth here come 
from the Giovannis’ and Palmers’ complaints and documents 
referenced therein, and are taken in the light most favorable to 
them.  See Schuchardt v. President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 
343 (3d Cir. 2016) (“In a facial attack, we review only ‘the 
allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein 
and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.’” (quoting Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 
169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
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the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has 
specifically warned that drinking water containing PFOA and 
PFOS above certain thresholds poses health risks.  It issued a 
non-binding provisional health advisory recommending a 
maximum combined PFOA/PFOS concentration in public 
drinking water of 70 parts per trillion (0.07 µg/L).   
 
Groundwater sampling at both the Naval Facilities 
revealed that the PFOA and the PFOS levels exceeded the 
health advisory levels.  Those facilities, being in need of 
further investigation to determine the nature and extent of the 
public health and environmental risks associated with 
chemical contamination, have been added to the National 
Priorities List (“NPL”), which is also sometimes called the 
Superfund List.2  The Navy has begun environmental cleanup 
efforts, and the parties do not dispute that those efforts are 
ongoing in both places. 
 
Kristen Giovanni, along with her husband Charles 
Giovanni, her son Anthony Giovanni, and two other minor 
children V.G. and D.G., lives across the street from the 
Willow Grove facility.  The water from their private well had 
a combined PFOA/PFOS level of 2.88 µg/L, which exceeds 
the concentration exposure threshold recommended by the 
                                              
2  The NPL is a list, compiled by the EPA, of facilities 
throughout the United States and its territories that are 
considered “national priorities” among all the facilities known 
to have involved releases, or that threaten releases, of 
hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants.  
Superfund: National Priorities List (NPL), 
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-national-priorities-
list-npl (last visited June 25, 2018). 
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EPA.  The Navy provided the Giovannis with bottled water 
for several months before it connected them to the 
Warrington Township public water supply.  But even that 
public water supply is contaminated with PFCs.   
 
Dorothy Palmer, along with her son George Palmer, 
has lived less than one mile from the Warminster facility 
since 1981.  For years, they used a private well on their 
property, until they learned about the PFOA and PFOS 
contamination in the groundwater.  The water from their 
private well had a combined PFOA/PFOS level of 0.62 µg/L, 
which exceeds the combined exposure threshold 
recommended by the EPA.  The Navy provided the Palmers 
with bottled water until it connected them to the Warminster 
Municipal Authority’s public water supply.  Subsequent 
testing of that supply has revealed PFC contamination there 
too.   
 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The Giovannis filed a complaint against the Navy in 
the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and the 
Palmers did the same in the Bucks County Court of Common 
Pleas.  Both complaints alleged harm from the contaminated 
public and private water sources for residents around the 
Naval Facilities due to the Navy’s allegedly improper 
disposal of hazardous substances.  Each complaint included a 
single state law claim under HSCA seeking, among other 
things, the costs of medical monitoring and an order 
compelling the Navy to conduct a health assessment or health 
effects study that would include blood testing for themselves, 
and “others exposed to the contaminants and hazardous 
substances released from the Warminster and Willow Grove 
8 
[f]acilities[.]”  (Palmer Appendix (“P.A.”) at 16.)  They also 
alleged that the Navy waived its sovereign immunity pursuant 
to § 120(a)(1) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1), and 
§ 6001(a) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a).   
 
The Navy removed both cases to the District Court 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).  The Giovannis and Palmers 
then filed motions to remand their cases to state court.  The 
Navy responded by moving to dismiss the cases without 
remand, which the Giovannis and Palmers opposed. 
 
The District Court held a hearing on the competing 
motions in the Giovannis’ case.  The parties agreed that 
removal was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, which prompted 
the Court to deny the motion for remand.  Ultimately, the 
Court dismissed the Giovannis’ complaint, and it issued a 
thorough and detailed memorandum opinion to support its 
decision.  It concluded that § 113(h) of CERCLA3 deprived it 
                                              
3  Section 113(h), which is codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(h), states: 
 
(h) Timing of review 
 
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under 
Federal law other than under section 1332 of 
Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction) or under State law which is 
applicable or relevant and appropriate under 
section [121 of the Act] (relating to cleanup 
standards) to review any challenges to removal 
or remedial action selected under section [104 
9 
                                                                                                     
of the Act], or to review any order issued under 
section [106(a) of the Act], in any action except 
one of the following: 
 
(1) An action under section [107 of the 
Act] to recover response costs or 
damages or for contribution. 
 
(2) An action to enforce an order issued 
under section [106(a) of the Act] or to 
recover a penalty for violation of such 
order. 
 
(3) An action for reimbursement under 
section [106(b)(2) of the Act]. 
 
(4) An action under section [159 of the 
Act] (relating to citizens suits) alleging 
that the removal or remedial action taken 
under section [104 of the Act] or secured 
under section [106 of the Act] was in 
violation of any requirement of this 
chapter. Such an action may not be 
brought with regard to a removal where a 
remedial action is to be undertaken at the 
site. 
 
(5) An action under section [106 of the 
Act] in which the United States has 
moved to compel a remedial action. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). 
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of jurisdiction to hear a claim that would interfere with an 
ongoing cleanup under CERCLA, and that the Giovannis’ 
claims that the Navy should pay for medical monitoring and 
should provide a health study amounted to a challenge to the 
ongoing response actions at the Naval Facilities.  The Court 
construed § 113(h) of CERCLA as depriving both it and the 
state courts of jurisdiction, and thus it dismissed the 
Giovannis’ case under the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction, 
without remand.   
 
The District Court then disposed of the Palmers’ 
complaint in a footnote order granting the Navy’s motion to 
dismiss, “consistent with the Court’s Opinion in Giovanni[.]”  
(P.A. at 45.)  In that order, the District Court rejected an 
additional argument raised by the Palmers, namely that the 
cleanup activities were initiated under § 120 of CERCLA4 
                                                                                                     
 
4  Section 120 of CERCLA, which is codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 9620, clarifies that the Act applies to federal 
facilities: 
 
Each department, agency, and instrumentality 
of the United States (including the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches of 
government) shall be subject to, and comply 
with, this chapter in the same manner and to the 
same extent, both procedurally and 
substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, 
including liability under section [107 of the 
Act].  Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to affect the liability of any person or entity 
under sections [106 and 107 of the Act]. 
11 
and were therefore not affected by § 113(h)’s jurisdictional 
bar.  It concluded that the authority to clean up the Naval 
Facilities derived from § 104 of the Act,5 not § 120.   
 
The Giovannis and Palmers filed these timely appeals.  
Amicus briefs have been filed in support of the Giovannis and 
Palmers by the following groups: (1) the Delaware 
Riverkeeper Network and Maya van Rossum, also known as 
the Delaware Riverkeeper; (2) the Toxics Action Center; and 
(3) Brendan Boyle, Lori Cervera, Renee Frugoli, Hope 
Grosse, Yvonne Love, Minde Ruch, Joanne Stanton, and 
Jacquelyn Rose Wiest, all of whom currently live or formerly 
lived near the Naval Facilities.6 
                                                                                                     
 
42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1). 
 
5  Section 104 of CERCLA, which is codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 9604, authorizes the President “to remove or arrange 
for the removal of, and provide for remedial action” which he 
“deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare or 
the environment” whenever “any hazardous substance is 
released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into 
the environment[.]”  42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). 
 
6  We are grateful for the additional insights provided 
by the amici. 
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III. DISCUSSION7 
 
We will affirm in part and vacate in part the District 
Court’s dismissal of the Giovannis’ and Palmers’ complaints 
and will affirm its decision not to remand to state court.  
Although the requests for a government-led health assessment 
or health effects study are barred under § 113(h) as challenges 
to ongoing response actions, the requests for the costs 
associated with private party medical monitoring are not 
barred by that CERCLA provision because that relief does not 
interfere with or alter the ongoing cleanup efforts.  Moreover, 
the relief sought by the Giovannis’ and Palmers’ on their 
medical monitoring claims is best characterized as injunctive 
relief, and the federal government has waived sovereign 
immunity to suits by private parties seeking such relief.  We 
will therefore vacate the District Court’s dismissal of the 
                                              
7  Our jurisdiction to review the District Court’s 
rulings is uncontested and is rooted in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The 
District Court’s jurisdiction is contested.  The Giovannis’ and 
Palmers’ state law claims were properly removed to federal 
court by the Navy under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) because the 
Navy presented colorable federal defenses, including that the 
claims are barred under § 113(h) of CERCLA and that it is 
entitled to sovereign immunity.  See Mesa v. California, 489 
U.S. 121, 136 (1989) (noting that removal is proper when a 
defendant demonstrates the presence of a federal question, 
either in the form of a federal claim or a colorable federal 
defense); see also Parker v. Della Rocco, 252 F.3d 663, 665 
n.2 (2d Cir. 2001) (characterizing sovereign immunity as a 
federal defense when asserted by a federal agency).  The 
parties dispute the applicability of those defenses, and we will 
address those disputes herein. 
13 
Giovannis’ and Palmers’ requests for costs associated with 
private party medical monitoring and remand for further 
proceedings on those claims. 
 
Our review of a district court’s grant of a motion to 
dismiss is plenary.  Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 
F.3d 188, 193 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013).  When there is a facial 
attack on subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), see supra note 1, “we review only 
‘the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced 
therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.’”  Schuchardt v. President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 
343 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Gould Elecs. v. United States, 
220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Furthermore, “we 
exercise plenary review over a district court’s interpretation 
of CERCLA[.]”  Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. 
Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  And our review of a 
“[d]istrict [c]ourt’s interpretation and application of legal 
rules and doctrines” is plenary.  McBride v. Int’l 
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 778 F.3d 453, 458 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 
A. Lack of Jurisdiction Over “Challenges” 
Under § 113(h) 
The Navy argues that federal courts are without 
jurisdiction to rule on the Giovannis’ and Palmers’ state law 
claims because they are barred under § 113(h) as “challenges” 
to ongoing cleanup efforts at the Naval Facilities.  The 
Giovannis and Palmers, of course, disagree because, as they 
see it, their requested relief will not interfere with those 
ongoing efforts.  We therefore first address whether state law 
claims seeking compensation to fund private party medical 
monitoring and state law claims seeking a government-led 
14 
health assessment or health effects study are “challenges to 
removal or remedial action” under § 113(h).8  Our conclusion 
is that the latter are challenges but the former are not.  To 
understand why, we turn to the pertinent portions of 
CERCLA. 
 
That complex statute was enacted in 1980 “in response 
to the serious environmental and health risks posed by 
industrial pollution.”  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009).  It gives “the 
President broad power to command government agencies and 
private parties to clean up hazardous waste sites.”  Key Tronic 
Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994).  CERLCA 
was designed, in part, “to ensure that the costs of such 
cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for the 
contamination.”  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 556 U.S. at 
602 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 
Section 113(b) of the Act provides that “the United 
States district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction 
                                              
8  Medical monitoring is meant “to compensate 
plaintiffs who have been exposed to various toxic substances” 
by accounting for latent diseases or injuries.  In re Paoli R.R. 
Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 849 (3d Cir. 1990).  “[A]n 
action for medical monitoring seeks to recover only the 
quantifiable costs of periodic medical examinations necessary 
to detect the onset of physical harm[.]”  Id. at 850.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, medical monitoring claims are cognizable 
under HSCA and the common law.  Redland Soccer Club, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Army of U.S., 55 F.3d 827, 849 n.12 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
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over all controversies arising under [CERCLA].”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(b).  Pursuant to § 113(h), however, jurisdiction is 
unavailable under federal or state law “to review any 
challenges to removal or remedial action selected under 
section [104][9] …, or to review any order issued under 
section [106(a).][10]”  Id. § 9613(h).  Courts have described 
                                              
9  Section 104 of CERCLA defines response 
authorities under the Act, including the President’s authority 
to institute removal and remedial actions to clean up 
contaminated facilities; it also sets forth limitations on his 
response authority, and exceptions to those limitations.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).  It details other cleanup-related matters 
too, including financial constraints, funding, interactions with 
state authorities, information gathering processes, and 
emergency response powers.  See generally id. § 9604(b)-(k). 
 
10  That provision of the Act states: 
 
In addition to any other action taken by a State 
or local government, when the President 
determines that there may be an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to the public health or 
welfare or the environment because of an actual 
or threatened release of a hazardous substance 
from a facility, he may require the Attorney 
General of the United States to secure such 
relief as may be necessary to abate such danger 
or threat, and the district court of the United 
States in the district in which the threat occurs 
shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the 
public interest and the equities of the case may 
require. The President may also, after notice to 
16 
§ 113(h) as “a ‘blunt withdrawal of federal jurisdiction.’”  
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 
325, 328 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting N. Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 
930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1991)).  It applies to “any 
challenges,” not just those brought under CERCLA.  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 
A well-established body of case law, including our 
own, provides guidance on what it means to “challenge” a 
response action.  We have said that § 113(h) “clearly 
preclude[s] jurisdiction to delay or interfere with EPA clean-
up activities[.]”  Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 
1023 (3d Cir. 1991).  Other courts have noted that “[a] 
lawsuit challenges a removal action if it ‘calls into question’” 
the removal plan.  Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1335 
(10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).  Put in more concrete 
terms, “a suit challenges a removal action if it ‘interferes with 
the implementation of a CERCLA remedy’ because ‘the relief 
requested will impact the [removal] action selected.’”11  Id. 
                                                                                                     
the affected State, take other action under this 
section including, but not limited to, issuing 
such orders as may be necessary to protect 
public health and welfare and the environment. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). 
 
11  See also El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States, 750 
F.3d 863, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[A] claim is a § 113(h) 
‘challenge’ if it will interfere with a ‘removal’ or a ‘remedial 
action.’”); McClellan, 47 F.3d at 330 (describing the relief as 
a challenge under § 113(h) because it “would clearly interfere 
with the cleanup”); Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of Wash., 66 
17 
(alteration in original) (quoting Broward Gardens Tenants 
Ass’n v. EPA, 311 F.3d 1066, 1072 (11th Cir. 2002)); see also 
Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 675 (8th Cir. 
1998) (indicating that a lawsuit is not a “challenge” under 
§ 113(h) if it “would not involve altering the terms of [a] 
cleanup order” and “would result only in financial penalties” 
(citation omitted)). 
 
 In some cases, “it may be necessary to assess the nexus 
between the nature of the suit and the CERCLA cleanup: the 
more closely related, the clearer it will be that the suit is a 
‘challenge.’”  El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States, 750 F.3d 
863, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  Even though practically any 
lawsuit could “increase[] the cost of a cleanup or divert[] 
resources or personnel from it[,]” that does not mean that 
every suit, or every request for relief within a suit, 
automatically “challenges” the cleanup.  McClellan, 47 F.3d 
at 330.  Enforcement of minimum wage laws, for example, 
would have that effect, but seeking enforcement of such laws 
is too attenuated from the cleanup itself to be considered a 
challenge to the remediation activities.  Id. 
 
A suit challenges a response action if it would, for 
example, “dictate specific remedial actions and … alter the 
method and order for cleanup[.]”  Broward Gardens, 311 
F.3d at 1072 (first alteration in original) (quoting Razore v. 
Tulalip Tribes of Wash., 66 F.3d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1995)).  
Conversely, a lawsuit does not challenge a response action if 
it does not “call into question the selected … remedial or 
removal plan[.]”  Id. at 1073. 
                                                                                                     
F.3d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1995) (“An action constitutes a 
challenge if it is related to the goals of the cleanup.”). 
18 
 
To assess whether a suit is a challenge, we must also 
consider the meaning of the terms “removal” and “remedial” 
action as used in § 113(h).  The statute defines “response” 
efforts to include “remove, removal, remedy, and remedial 
action[.]”  42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).  Removal actions generally 
include short-term or immediate efforts, while remedial 
actions typically involve longer term activities.  Black Horse 
Lane Assoc., L.P. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 228 F.3d 275, 293 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
 
CERCLA defines the term “removal” to mean: 
 
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous 
substances from the environment, such actions 
as may be necessary taken [sic] in the event of 
the threat of release of hazardous substances 
into the environment, such actions as may be 
necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the 
release or threat of release of hazardous 
substances, the disposal of removed material, or 
the taking of such other actions as may be 
necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate 
damage to the public health or welfare or to the 
environment, which may otherwise result from 
a release or threat of release.  The term 
includes, in addition, without being limited to, 
security fencing or other measures to limit 
access, provision of alternative water supplies, 
temporary evacuation and housing of threatened 
individuals not otherwise provided for, action 
taken under section [104(b) of CERCLA], and 
any emergency assistance which may be 
19 
provided under the Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 5121 
et seq.]. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). 
 
The even lengthier definition of “remedial action” is: 
 
those actions consistent with permanent remedy 
taken instead of or in addition to removal 
actions in the event of a release or threatened 
release of a hazardous substance into the 
environment, to prevent or minimize the release 
of hazardous substances so that they do not 
migrate to cause substantial danger to present or 
future public health or welfare or the 
environment.  The term includes, but is not 
limited to, such actions at the location of the 
release as storage, confinement, perimeter 
protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay 
cover, neutralization, cleanup of released 
hazardous substances and associated 
contaminated materials, recycling or reuse, 
diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive 
wastes, dredging or excavations, repair or 
replacement of leaking containers, collection of 
leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or 
incineration, provision of alternative water 
supplies, and any monitoring reasonably 
required to assure that such actions protect the 
public health and welfare and the environment.  
The term includes the costs of permanent 
relocation of residents and businesses and 
20 
community facilities where the President 
determines that, alone or in combination with 
other measures, such relocation is more cost-
effective than and environmentally preferable to 
the transportation, storage, treatment, 
destruction, or secure disposition offsite of 
hazardous substances, or may otherwise be 
necessary to protect the public health or 
welfare; the term includes offsite transport and 
offsite storage, treatment, destruction, or secure 
disposition of hazardous substances and 
associated contaminated materials. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). 
 
With those definitions in mind, we analyze whether the 
relief requested by the Giovannis and Palmers constitutes a 
challenge under §113(h) to ongoing cleanup efforts at the 
Naval Facilities.  We take a holistic approach that 
encompasses several considerations.  One is whether the 
relief can be classified as a “removal” or “remedial” step.  
Another and closely related consideration is the specific form 
of relief requested and whether it would compel the defendant 
to take some action or refrain from taking some action, or 
instead seeks to have the defendant pay for a third party to 
provide services.  A further consideration is whether, on the 
whole, there is reason to think that a given request for relief 
will conflict with, impact, or otherwise interfere with the 
ongoing cleanup efforts.12  We address each of those three 
considerations seriatim. 
                                              
 12  Our concurring colleague disagrees with our holistic 
approach and advocates a bright line test for determining 
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 1. Removal and Remedial Actions 
  
 The provision at issue here – § 113(h) – states, in 
relevant part, that federal courts lack jurisdiction “to review 
                                                                                                     
whether a claim for relief constitutes a challenge.  The 
concurrence relies on the District of Columbia Circuit’s 
opinion in El Paso Natural Gas Company v. United States, 
750 F.3d 863, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2014), to propose “a single 
framework” for analysis – whether the claim for relief 
interferes with a removal or remedial action.  Concur. Slip 
Op. at 2-3.  But the analysis is not so simple and El Paso does 
not suggest that it is.  The El Paso opinion does provide a 
helpful way to conceptualize what a challenge is, but the 
court acknowledged that there will be situations in which “it 
may be necessary to assess the nexus between the nature of 
the suit and the CERCLA cleanup” before being able to 
determine whether a claim for relief would “interfere” with a 
removal or remedial action.  750 F.3d at 880.  It did not 
purport to set forth a single bright line test. 
 In laying out our analytical framework, we have relied 
on the collective experience of our own Court and our sister 
courts, including the D.C. Circuit in El Paso, to create an 
approach that we hope is sufficiently flexible to account for 
the myriad circumstances in which CERCLA litigation arises 
and yet clear enough to give useful guidance to district courts.  
We appreciate our colleague’s desire to simplify the 
“challenge” analysis for the benefit of future litigants and 
courts, and we share that desire.  But we think that a 
framework that relies on nothing but the word “interfere” to 
inform future litigation – a word that does not appear at all in 
the statutory text but rather emerged through case law – will 
not be as helpful as our colleague believes. 
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any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under 
section [104.]”  Id. § 9613(h).  Thus, if the requested relief 
can be classified as a removal or remedial action, it is 
possible that it will conflict with, impact, or otherwise 
interfere with an ongoing CERCLA cleanup for purposes of 
§ 113(h).  The question, then, is whether the Giovannis’ and 
Palmers’ requests for relief – private party medical 
monitoring and a government-led health study – fit the 
statutory definitions of removal or remedial action. 
 
   a. Private Party Medical   
    Monitoring 
 The text of the statute does not suggest that private 
party medical monitoring is a removal action.  The reference 
to “monitor[ing]” in the definition of “removal” refers to 
“monitor[ing], assess[ing], and evaluat[ing] the release or 
threat of release of hazardous substances,” not the monitoring 
of individuals for latent diseases or injuries.  42 U.S.C. 
§9601(23).  And while the definition of “removal” also 
includes “actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, 
or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the 
environment, which may otherwise result from a release or 
threat of release,” when read in context of the other actions 
listed, medical monitoring does not appear to be 
contemplated.  Id.  It is a standard principle of statutory 
construction that “a word [or phrase] is known by the 
company it keeps[.]”  Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 
1085 (2015).  That principle, known as noscitur a sociis, 
counsels courts “to ‘avoid ascribing to one word [or phrase] a 
meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying 
words [or phrases], thus giving unintended breadth to the 
Acts of Congress.”  Id. (citation omitted).  The other actions 
listed in the definition of “removal” refer to activities directly 
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related to the physical removal, containment, assessment, or 
evaluation of hazardous waste, not broadly to all potential 
actions taken because of a toxic release.  Furthermore, 
because removal actions focus on the short term, it would be 
odd to classify medical monitoring as a “removal” action, 
given that medical monitoring is a way to address problems 
that only emerge over time. 
 
 Nor does the text support classifying private party 
medical monitoring as a remedial action.  Although medical 
monitoring is certainly “consistent with [a] permanent 
remedy[,]” it is not taken “to prevent or minimize the release 
of hazardous substances.”  42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).  And while 
the statutory definition of “remedial action” references “any 
monitoring reasonably required to … protect the public health 
and welfare and the environment,” that monitoring expressly 
relates to the previously listed items in the definition, 
showing that the contemplated monitoring is “to assure that 
such actions protect the public health and welfare and the 
environment.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The referenced “such 
actions” all relate to physical remediation efforts, including 
dredging, excavations, diversions, repairs, incineration, 
neutralization, and trenching.  See id.  The text of the statute 
therefore does not easily support classifying private party 
medical monitoring as either a “removal” or a “remedial” 
action, and, consequently, it is not a response action.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(25) (defining “response” in terms of “removal” 
and “remedial” actions). 
 
 There is precedent for our interpretation.  In Daigle v. 
Shell Oil Co., for example, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that medical monitoring 
does not meet the statutory definitions for removal and 
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remedial actions because both definitions were “directed at 
containing and cleaning up hazardous substance releases[,]” 
not “[l]ongterm health monitoring.”  972 F.2d 1527, 1535 
(10th Cir. 1992); see also Price v. United States Navy, 39 
F.3d 1011, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding, in the 
context of a response cost analysis under § 107(a) of 
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), that “medical monitoring” 
does not fit the definition of “removal” or “remedial” action 
as defined under CERCLA); cf. Syms v. Olin Corp., 408 F.3d 
95, 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (same).13 
 
 The District Court distinguished those cases by stating 
that they involved an assessment of whether medical 
monitoring expenses are response costs.  It said that the 
reasoning in those cases is “flawed because it assumes that 
‘response costs’ and ‘response’ mean the same thing under 
CERCLA,” but “[t]hey do not.”  (Giovanni Joint Appendix 
(“G.J.A.”) at 114.)  The Court determined instead that, while 
                                              
13  See also Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 
1244-50 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (concluding that CERCLA’s 
definition of “removal” does not encompass medical 
monitoring); Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 
713-14 (D. Kan. 1991) (same); Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 
F. Supp. 413, 418 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (determining that the 
definition of “response” did not include medical monitoring); 
Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., No. 88-0120, 1988 WL 120739, 
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1988) (stating that it was “difficult to 
understand how future medical testing and monitoring of 
persons who were exposed to contaminated well water prior 
to the remedial measures currently underway” could 
constitute a “removal” action under CERCLA). 
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all “removal and remedial actions” are “responses” under 
CERCLA, not all such actions are “response costs.”  (G.J.A. 
at 114-15.)  Therefore, it concluded, it “does not follow that 
all ‘response costs’ are necessarily ‘removal and remedial 
actions.’”  (G.J.A. at 115.)  We disagree with that analysis. 
 
 As the District Court noted, those particular cases cited 
by the Giovannis and Palmers were deciding whether a 
private party could recover the costs of medical monitoring 
under CERCLA, which required an assessment of whether 
medical monitoring expenses were “response costs” under 
§ 107(a).14  But the District Court’s heavy reliance on a 
distinction between the terms “response” and “response cost” 
is not sound.  It is true that CERCLA defines “response,” but 
not “cost” or “response cost.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 9601; cf. 
Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of Army of U.S., 55 F.3d 
827, 849 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The absence of a definition of 
‘response costs’ has been the source of much litigation since 
CERCLA’s enactment.”).  Yet to discount the cases cited by 
the Giovannis and Palmers simply because they speak most 
directly to “response costs” rather than “response” actions, is, 
we believe, to miss their significance.  Those cases undertake 
practically identical analyses to determine whether medical 
monitoring is a “removal” or “remedial action,” and thus 
necessarily a “response,” en route to determining whether it is 
                                              
14  Section 107(a), a provision for cost recovery claims, 
is one mechanism CERCLA provides for potentially 
responsible parties to recoup costs expended in cleaning up a 
contaminated site.  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); see also Agere Sys., 
Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 216-18 
(3d Cir. 2010) (summarizing the cost recovery mechanisms 
provided under CERCLA, including § 107(a)). 
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a “response cost.”  See Durfey v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co., 59 F.3d 121, 124-25 (9th Cir. 1995); Yslava v. Hughes 
Aircraft Co., 845 F. Supp. 705, 708-09 (D. Ariz. 1993).  
Regardless of the relationship between “response” and 
“response cost,” the cases concluded that private party 
medical monitoring is not a “response” action and so, by 
definition, is neither a removal or remedial action.  Durfey, 59 
F.3d at 125; Yslava, 845 F. Supp. at 709. 
 
 The Navy argues that medical monitoring should 
nevertheless be considered a “removal or remedial action” 
under CERCLA because of that statute’s provisions 
concerning the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry (“ATSDR”).  The ATSDR was created when 
CERCLA was enacted in 1980, and its purpose is the 
“compiling [of] health effects information[.]”  2 Susan M. 
Cooke, The Law of Hazardous Waste § 12.04[2][f].  When 
CERCLA was amended by the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”), Congress recognized 
“that inadequate attention had been given to the health effects 
of contaminants found at Superfund sites[.]”  Id.  Thus, it 
expanded the role of the ATSDR.  Id. § 12.05[2][h]. 
 
 The charge given to the agency is to “effectuate and 
implement [CERCLA’s] health related authorities[.]”  42 
U.S.C. § 9604(i)(1).  It is expressly authorized to “establish[] 
a health surveillance program[,]” id., and, in some instances, 
the statute requires it to initiate such a program, id. 
§ 9604(i)(9).  Health surveillance programs must include, but 
are not limited to, “periodic medical testing where appropriate 
of population subgroups to screen for diseases for which the 
population or subgroup is at significant increased risk … [, 
and the programs further include] a mechanism to refer for 
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treatment those individuals within such population who are 
screened positive for such diseases.”  Id. 
 
 Agreeing with the Navy, the District Court said that, 
because those CERCLA provisions relating to the ATSDR 
provided for a program that included “both periodic medical 
testing … and a mechanism to refer for treatment anyone who 
needs medical attention[,]” the medical monitoring requested 
by the Giovannis was a “removal” or “remedial” action as 
defined by the statute.  (G.J.A. at 112 n.6.)  The Court did not 
explore the connection, though, between CERCLA’s 
definitions of “removal” or “remedial” action and its 
provisions relating to the ATSDR.  We think that connection 
depends on the distinction between private party actors and 
state actors. 
 
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit has thoroughly considered whether the ATSDR’s 
health “surveillance activit[ies] … [are] removal or remedial 
action[s] entitled to the protection of [§ 113(h)].”  Hanford 
Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1475 
(9th Cir. 1995).  It decided that they are, explaining that the 
pertinent statutory provision – § 104 – was titled “response 
authorities,” and “Congress gave no indication that the 
universe of CERCLA response authorities cannot include 
both the health and non-health related activities found in 
[§ 104.]”  Id. at 1475-76.  The court noted that other parts of 
§ 104 also contemplated actions of public health authorities 
being “response measures,” because the President was 
authorized to “take any other response measure … necessary 
to protect the public health or welfare or environment.”  Id. at 
1476 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)).  It thus concluded that 
“Congress’ single reference to ATSDR authorities as ‘health 
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related’ should be read narrowly as a means to distinguish 
between different types of response authorities, rather than 
interpreted broadly as an effort to differentiate ATSDR health 
… surveillance activity from response actions protected by 
[§ 113(h)].”15  Id. 
 
 Significantly, the court did not believe that its 
conclusion undermined its previous decisions in Durfey and 
Price, which “held that private party medical monitoring 
activities, initiated and coordinated independently of ongoing 
CERCLA cleanup efforts, were not … removal or remedial 
actions.”  Id. at 1477.  It said that the reasoning in those cases 
did “not apply to health … surveillance actions engaged in by 
a governmental agency pursuant to explicit CERCLA 
provisions.”  Id. (emphasis added).  It further said that its 
interpretation was “rooted in the distinction Congress drew 
between public and private efforts to monitor the public 
health.”  Id. at 1478.  Congress used the ATSDR to “expand 
the role [of] government health … surveillance[,]” but did 
nothing to add back in the personal rights to recovery of 
medical expenses (such as for private party medical 
monitoring) that were intentionally excised from original 
drafts of CERCLA.  Id. at 1479. 
                                              
15  The court limited its holding to the specific ATSDR 
activities under review because it noted that not all ATSDR 
activities should qualify “per se [as] removal or remedial 
actions for purposes of CERCLA’s Timing of Review 
provision.”  Hanford, 71 F.3d at 1476.  That is because some 
of the agency’s duties would not ordinarily constitute 
response actions, such as the ATSDR’s general duties to 
maintain various health-related registries and inventories.  Id. 
at 1476 n.9. 
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 The court bolstered its conclusion that ATSDR’s 
health surveillance activities are response actions with three 
reasons related to CERCLA’s remedial purposes.  Id. at 1481.  
First, Congress has made it clear, especially with the 
enactment of SARA, that one of CERCLA’s goals is to 
protect the public health.  Id.  Second, there are many 
instances in which CERCLA privileges governmental efforts 
over private party efforts.  Id.  Finally, recognizing that the 
ATSDR’s activities constitute “removal or remedial action” is 
most consistent with Congress’s effort to integrate the 
agency’s functions into NPL cleanups.  Id. at 1474, 1481-82. 
 
 The analysis provided by the Ninth Circuit Court in 
Hanford is persuasive.  We adopt it, with the conclusion that 
CERCLA distinguishes between private party medical 
monitoring activities and government-led health 
surveillance.16  Private party medical monitoring falls outside 
of the definition of response action, but government-led 
monitoring does not.17 
                                              
16  The Ninth Circuit also determined “that the ATSDR 
health … surveillance activities [at the specific site in 
question] satisfy the definition of removal action.”  Hanford, 
71 F.3d at 1477.  We do not need to, and thus do not, decide 
that here.  Although the classification of response actions as 
either removal or remedial actions may have significant legal 
and practical consequences under the Act in other 
circumstances, it is enough here for us to conclude that the 
ATSDR’s health surveillance activities are response actions. 
 
 17  The concurrence disagrees that the distinction 
between private actors and government actors makes a 
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Accordingly, the Giovannis’ and Palmers’ requests for 
an order compelling the Navy to pay for the costs associated 
with private party medical monitoring is relief that falls 
outside of CERCLA’s definition of “removal or remedial 
action.”  And that counsels in favor of concluding that their 
requests do not, under § 113(h), constitute a jurisdiction-
stripping challenge to an ongoing CERCLA response action. 
 
  b. Health Assessment or Health  
    Effects Study 
 
We turn next to the Giovannis’ and Palmers’ requests 
for a government-led health assessment or health effects 
study.  As a general matter, a health study would not fit the 
                                                                                                     
difference in the analysis of whether a claim for relief 
constitutes a challenge.  Concur. Slip Op. at 3-4.  Our 
colleague stresses that the statutory language focuses on 
“actions” and not “actors.”  Id.  We take a different message 
from the existence of the ATSDR provisions, which create a 
framework for government actors to conduct medical 
monitoring and health effect studies.  42 U.S.C. § 9604(i).  
Those statutory provisions show that Congress has made a 
distinction between government action and private action.  
When a court orders the government to do something – 
particularly something that, like a health effects study 
contemplated by the ATSDR provisions, is already regulated 
by statute – separation-of-powers issues may be implicated 
that would not be when ordering action from a private party.  
That seems a pertinent factor to consider in determining 
whether a claim interferes with the work of the government in 
a cleanup. 
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statute’s definition of removal action for the same reasons 
that private party medical monitoring falls outside that 
definition.  References to “assess[ing]” or “evaluat[ing]” refer 
to “the release or threat of release of hazardous substances,” 
not the study of the effects of contaminants on human health.  
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).  And the definition’s inclusion of 
“actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or 
mitigate damage to the public health or welfare” does not 
contemplate a generic health study because such a study does 
not align with the subsequent list of activities directly related 
to the evaluation of hazardous waste in connection with its 
immediate removal.  Id.  Nor does the text of the statute 
support classifying a generic health study as a remedial 
action.  Such a study is not taken “to prevent or minimize the 
release of hazardous substances,” and it does not necessarily 
relate to conducting an evaluation or assessment to promote 
environmental remediation efforts.  42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). 
 
But the Giovannis and Palmers are not requesting a 
generic health study.  They want a government-led health 
assessment or health effects study.  One of the things the 
ATSDR is charged with “effectuat[ing] and implement[ing]” 
is the completion of a “health assessment” within one year of 
an EPA proposal to list a site on the NPL.18  Id. § 9604(i)(1), 
                                              
18  The statute defines the term “health assessment” to 
mean: 
 
preliminary assessments of the potential risk to 
human health posed by individual sites and 
facilities, based on such factors as the nature 
and extent of contamination, the existence of 
potential pathways of human exposure 
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(6)(A).  The purpose of that assessment is “to assist in 
determining whether actions … should be taken to reduce 
human exposure to hazardous substances from a facility and 
whether additional information on human exposure and 
associated health risks is needed and should be acquired[.]”  
Id. § 9604(i)(6)(G).  Among the ways to acquire that 
information is “conducting epidemiological studies[.]”  Id.  If 
such a health assessment leads the ATSDR Administrator to 
conclude “that there is a significant increased risk of adverse 
health effects in humans from exposure to hazardous 
substances[,]” then the statute requires the ATSDR to set up a 
health surveillance program for the affected population.  Id. 
§ 9604(i)(9). 
 
As discussed above with respect to private party 
medical monitoring, Congress differentiated between 
government-led and private efforts to assess and protect the 
                                                                                                     
(including ground or surface water 
contamination, air emissions, and food chain 
contamination), the size and potential 
susceptibility of the community within the 
likely pathways of exposure, the comparison of 
expected human exposure levels to the short-
term and long-term health effects associated 
with identified hazardous substances and any 
available recommended exposure or tolerance 
limits for such hazardous substances, and the 
comparison of existing morbidity and mortality 
data on diseases that may be associated with the 
observed levels of exposure. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(F). 
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public health following a release or threat of release of 
hazardous waste.  Hanford, 71 F.3d at 1478.  Government-led 
health studies, unlike generic health studies conducted by 
private parties, are response actions deemed by Congress as 
necessary for evaluating the release or threatened release of 
hazardous substances.  See id. at 1475, 1477 (concluding that 
ATSDR health assessment activities are removal or remedial 
actions for purposes of § 113(h)).  That conclusion comports 
with Congress’s goal of protecting the public health when it 
enacted SARA, as well as being consistent with CERCLA’s 
favoring of governmental efforts over private party efforts, 
and Congress’s effort to integrate the ATSDR’s functions into 
the cleanups of Superfund sites.  Id. at 1481-82. 
 
Here, unlike their requests for private party medical 
monitoring, the Giovannis’ and Palmers’ requests that the 
District Court order the Navy to conduct a health assessment 
or health effects study, including blood testing, do constitute 
removal or remedial actions for purposes of § 113(h).  
Because the ATSDR has authority to conduct health 
assessments on behalf of the government at contaminated 
facilities, and those activities are response actions under 
CERCLA, the Giovannis’ and Palmers’ demand that another 
agency of the government conduct such a study would, if 
granted, interfere with a response action under CERCLA. 
 
 Therefore, we agree with the District Court’s 
determination that the requested relief mandating that the 
Navy perform a health assessment or health effects study is a 
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response action under CERCLA, which suggests that it is a 
challenge under § 113(h).19 
                                              
 19  The concurrence would not construe the requests 
for a health effects study as a response action because 
§ 107(a)(4)(A) refers to “removal or remedial action” and 
§ 107(a)(4)(D) separately refers to “any health assessment or 
healthy effects study carried out under [the ATSDR 
provisions.]”  Concur. Slip Op. at 4-6.  According to the 
concurrence, § 107(a)(4)(D) would be “superfluous” if a 
health effect study were to be construed as a removal or 
remedial action.  Id. at 5.  But, as the concurrence itself 
highlights, § 107(a)(4)(D) was grafted onto the statute as part 
of the SARA amendments to CERCLA.  Id.  The addition of 
§ 107(a)(4)(D) suggests that Congress wanted to emphasize 
that CERCLA liability encompassed the costs of government-
led health effects studies; it does not demonstrate 
unambiguous congressional intent to remove government-led 
health effects studies from the ambit of all remedial or 
removal actions.  Cf. Hanford, 71 F.3d at 1479 (“[W]e 
decline to read the failure of Congress to accomplish the 
seamless integration of ATSDR provisions with the other 
response authorities found under sub-section [107(a)(4)] as 
compelling proof of Congress’ intent to distinguish ATSDR 
activities from removal and remedial actions.”).  Had 
Congress enacted § 107(a)(4)(A) and § 107(a)(4)(D) at the 
same time, then the concurrence’s statutory structure 
argument might have more persuasive force.  But the timing 
of the SARA amendments significantly undermines the 
position pressed by our colleague.  Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit has been characterizing ATSDR activities as removal 
and remedial actions for nearly a quarter century.  Hanford, 
71 F.3d at 1479-80.  If Congress thought that the courts had 
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  2. Form of Relief Requested 
 
When assessing whether a claim challenges an 
ongoing cleanup effort, courts have also distinguished among 
forms of relief as they affect the defending party.20  
Generally, requests for injunctive relief that relate in any way 
to pending response actions are viewed as challenges under 
§ 113(h).  If a plaintiff demands that a defendant engage in 
activities that could have been a part of the cleanup plan, then 
it is a challenge to the selected response actions.  See, e.g., 
McClellan, 47 F.3d at 329-30 (concluding that injunctive 
relief injecting new requirements into a CERCLA cleanup 
effort would clearly constitute a challenge because it would 
interfere with those ongoing activities).  In contrast, requests 
that require little more of the defendant than the expenditure 
of money are generally not considered to be “challenges” 
under § 113(h).  See, e.g., Beck v. Atl. Richfield Co., 62 F.3d 
1240, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that a request for 
compensatory damages for crop loss, lost profits, and 
property devaluation due to water contamination was not a 
challenge because the damages claim did not interfere with 
the existing remedial plan). 
 
                                                                                                     
gotten it wrong, we hope it would have said something by 
now. 
 
20  We note again that § 113(h) only applies when the 
response actions at issue were selected under § 104, which 
authorizes the President to take certain actions, or when the 
order implicated was issued under § 106(a), which refers to 
additional actions the President may take. 
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But the adjectives “injunctive” and “monetary” are 
descriptors, not by themselves reasoned conclusions.  The 
effect that the sought-for relief has on the cleanup is what 
must be determinative, not the label a party or court uses to 
describe the claim for relief.  For example, a request that the 
defendant pay damages could constitute a challenge under 
§ 113(h) if it directly conflicts with the implementation of the 
cleanup plan.  See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 
646 F.3d 1214, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 2011) (construing a private 
plaintiff’s request for civil penalties resulting from the 
defendant’s noncompliance with an EPA administrative order 
as a challenge to an ongoing cleanup because the EPA had 
chosen not to sue to enforce its order and was using the 
leverage of civil penalties to ensure the defendant completed 
the remediation).  And, conversely, a request for injunctive 
relief that has no effect on an ongoing cleanup is unlikely to 
constitute a challenge.  See ARCO Envtl. Remediation, L.L.C. 
v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality of Mont., 213 F.3d 1108, 
1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that injunctive relief 
ordering the release of documentation to the public about a 
contaminated site does not challenge a pending cleanup effort 
because access to information “does not alter cleanup 
requirements or environmental standards” and does not 
“terminate or delay the … cleanup”).  We must consider the 
form of relief that the plaintiffs request and its impact on the 
defendant to determine whether the requested relief 
challenges an ongoing cleanup. 
 
  a. Private Party Medical   
    Monitoring 
 
Focusing on the specific relief requested here, payment 
for the costs of a private party medical monitoring program 
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does not appear to be a challenge under § 113(h).  The prayer 
for relief at the end of each complaint expressly states that the 
Giovannis and Palmers want the Navy to provide “the costs 
of medical monitoring[.]”  (G.J.A. at 27; P.A. at 16.)  In their 
briefing, the Giovannis and Palmers insist that the relief 
“would simply impose the costs of setting up a medical 
monitoring trust fund on the [Navy.]”  (Giovannis’ Opening 
Br. at 10; Palmers’ Reply Br. at 9-10.)  Thus, according to 
both the Giovannis’ and Palmers’ characterization of the 
relief that they seek with respect to medical monitoring, the 
Navy need do nothing but fund a trust.  That counsels in favor 
of concluding that the relief associated with the Giovannis’ 
and Palmers’ medical monitoring claim is not a challenge 
under § 113(h).  This is especially so because, as noted 
earlier, the private party medical monitoring program the 
Giovannis’ and Palmers’ want the Navy to fund is not a 
removal or remedial action. 
 
  b. Health Assessment or Health  
    Effects Study 
 
The government-led health study requested by the 
Giovannis and Palmers, when viewed through the form-of-
relief lens, appears in contrast to be a challenge under 
§ 113(h) to ongoing response efforts at the Naval Facilities.  
That relief amounts to a demand that the Navy take on 
additional efforts related to cleaning up the contamination at 
those Superfund sites.  Although the facts in this case differ 
from those in Hanford, which involved an injunction 
compelling the ATSDR to implement a health surveillance 
program, the relief requested here is analogous because the 
government is being asked to conduct a response action that 
the ATSDR may still be contemplating.  And like the 
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plaintiffs in McClellan, who wanted the court to impose 
additional RCRA reporting and permitting requirements upon 
an ongoing cleanup, the requested injunctive relief here 
would interfere with the ongoing cleanup efforts at the Naval 
Facilities because it would modify or replace the existing 
remedial plan.  The request for a government-led health 
assessment or health effects study is therefore effectively a 
request for injunctive relief, which counsels in favor of 
concluding that it is barred as a challenge under § 113(h). 
 
3. Impact on Ongoing Cleanup Efforts 
 
 Another consideration is whether, on the whole, there 
is some additional reason to think that a given request for 
relief will conflict with, impact, or otherwise interfere with an 
ongoing cleanup effort.  See Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1023 
(indicating that § 113(h) bars lawsuits that will “interfere 
with” ongoing remediation activities); see also Cannon, 538 
F.3d at 1335 (stating that § 113(h) precludes lawsuits that will 
“interfere[] with the implementation of a [selected] CERCLA 
remedy” (citation omitted)). 
 
   a. Private Party Medical   
    Monitoring 
 
It seems unlikely that the Giovannis’ and Palmers’ 
requests for the costs of private party medical monitoring will 
conflict with, impact, or otherwise interfere with the ongoing 
cleanup efforts at the Naval Facilities.  It will “in no way 
impede[] the progress of the government’s ongoing 
assessment and cleanup” at the contaminated site.  Yslava, 
845 F. Supp. at 710; see also Durfey, 59 F.3d at 126 (holding 
that the plaintiffs’ claim for private party medical monitoring 
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costs under state tort law was not a “challenge” to an ongoing 
CERCLA cleanup under § 113(h)).  Moreover, an order 
requiring the Navy to pay a sum of money to fund a private 
party medical monitoring program will “not in any manner … 
interfere with the ongoing activities of the ATSDR.”  Boggs 
v. Divested Atomic Corp., No. C-2-90-840, 1997 WL 
33377790, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 1997).  Although any 
money the Navy would provide to fund private party medical 
monitoring could divert funds from the cleanup efforts at the 
Naval Facilities, that is insufficient, standing alone, to render 
such relief a challenge under § 113(h).  See, e.g., El Paso Nat. 
Gas, 750 F.3d at 880 (“[E]very action that increases the cost 
of a cleanup or diverts resources or personnel from it does not 
thereby become a ‘challenge’ to the cleanup.” (quoting 
McClellan, 47 F.3d at 330)). 
 
 The District Court nevertheless held that the medical 
monitoring claims are barred by § 113(h) because they 
challenge the ongoing cleanups at the Naval Facilities.  In so 
holding, it relied heavily on our decision in Boarhead.  We 
said in that case that “Congress enacted CERCLA so that the 
EPA would have the authority and the funds necessary to 
respond expeditiously to serious hazards without being 
stopped in its tracks by legal entanglement before or during 
the hazard clean-up.”  923 F.2d at 1019.  We also said that the 
jurisdictional bar in § 113(h) was “designed to prevent time-
consuming litigation from delaying the prompt clean-up of 
these [contaminated] sites.”  Id.  Notably, we described 
“disputes about who is responsible for a hazardous site, what 
measures actually are necessary to clean-up the site and 
remove the hazard[,] or who is responsible for its costs” as 
lawsuits best left for “after the site has been cleaned up.”  Id. 
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 The District Court here concluded that requiring the 
Navy to pay for medical monitoring would interfere with the 
ongoing cleanup efforts because it “would necessarily entail 
deciding a ‘dispute[] about who is responsible for [the] 
hazardous site’ and ‘who is responsible for its costs.’”  
(G.J.A. at 113 (alterations in original) (internal citations 
omitted).)  The Court said that those “are decisions that 
Congress determined ‘should be dealt with after the site has 
been cleaned up.’”  (G.J.A. at 113 (quoting Boarhead, 923 
F.2d at 1019).) 
 
 That reliance on Boarhead is understandable but, in 
this instance, misplaced.  The plaintiff in that case was 
“challenging the EPA’s ability to conduct an [environmental] 
study pursuant to § 104 of CERCLA before the EPA 
perform[ed] an appropriate review[.]”  Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 
1018.  The plaintiff was thus directly interfering with the 
EPA’s ability to conduct a cleanup because it was seeking 
injunctive relief that would certainly have altered the existing 
remedial plans.  The facts here are quite different.  The 
Giovannis and Palmers want the Navy to fund a trust to cover 
the costs of private party medical monitoring rather than to 
take some additional action.  And it is not clear that there 
would be any litigation about who is responsible for the 
contamination or the costs of the cleanup.  The Navy freely 
admits that it “generated hazardous waste” and “released 
PFOA and PFOS” contaminants at the Naval Facilities.  
(Answering Br. at 11, 13.) 
 
 Finally, the District Court specifically distinguished 
the conclusions in Durfey and Yslava that private party 
medical monitoring claims are not challenges under § 113(h) 
because, in its view, those cases failed to explain why state 
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law medical monitoring claims are not disputes about who is 
responsible and hence, under § 113(h), should be dealt with 
after the cleanup is complete.  But we should not expect a 
discussion of “responsibility” for “necessary costs of 
response” and “response actions” in a case in which there has 
already been a determination that the requested remedy is not 
a “response” or “response cost.”  Furthermore, Durfey 
involved a government-owned property that was 
contaminated with radioactivity during the development of 
the atomic bomb in the 1940s, so there was likely no dispute 
that the government was responsible for the contamination.  
Thus, the District Court’s conclusion that the Giovannis’ and 
Palmers’ requests for the costs of private party medical 
monitoring were challenges for purposes of § 113(h) is, in our 
estimation, without adequate support. 
 
   b. Health Assessment or Health  
    Effects Study 
 
 The story is different for a government-led health 
study.  There is reason to believe that the Giovannis’ and 
Palmers’ requests that the Navy conduct a health assessment 
or health effects study will conflict with, impact, or otherwise 
interfere with the ongoing cleanup efforts at the Naval 
Facilities.  That relief “seeks to improve on the CERCLA 
cleanup” by adding work to the removal or remedial action 
already selected by the federal government at those facilities.  
El Paso Nat. Gas, 750 F.3d at 880-81 (quoting McClellan, 47 
F.3d at 330).  Ordering such relief necessarily preempts the 
federal government’s “ability to choose the best remedial 
action among a panoply of remedial alternatives that have 
been analyzed in a completed remedial investigation and 
feasibility study according to criteria articulated in 
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CERCLA,” id. at 881, especially with respect to those 
provisions relating to the ATSDR’s powers and obligations.  
Thus, the District Court’s conclusion that the Giovannis’ and 
Palmers’ requests for a government-led health study are 
challenges for purposes of § 113(h) is supported by the case 
law. 
 
 In sum, we conclude that the Giovannis’ and Palmers’ 
requests for funds to establish a private party medical 
monitoring program are not challenges for purposes of 
§ 113(h),21 but their requests for an order mandating that the 
Navy conduct a health assessment or health effects study are.  
We therefore lack jurisdiction to review those latter requests 
at this time. 
 
                                              
21  That conclusion is consistent with our decisions in 
the In re Paoli cases.  See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 
916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Paoli I”); In re Paoli R.R. Yard 
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Paoli II”); In re 
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 113 F.3d 444 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(“Paoli III”).  In those cases, despite ongoing cleanup efforts 
by the EPA, we said that the plaintiffs could move forward 
with their state law claims for medical monitoring.  See, e.g., 
Paoli III, 113 F.3d at 449 n.2; Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 785-95.  
Although we did not discuss § 113(h) in those cases, if we 
had reached a conclusion different than we do here, it would 
have undermined our jurisdiction to have decided them.  See 
also Clinton Cty. Comm’rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1025 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (en banc) (concluding that § 113(h)’s bar to 
challenges of ongoing EPA remedial efforts strips the federal 
courts of subject matter jurisdiction). 
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4. The Palmers’ Argument Under § 120 
 of CERCLA 
 
Notwithstanding any argument under § 113(h), the 
Palmers argue that the cleanup activities at the federal Naval 
Facilities were initiated under § 120 rather than § 104, and 
thus that § 113(h) is inapplicable to bar their state-law claim.  
The Navy counters that § 120 merely describes additional 
procedures unique to federal land, and does not confer any 
authority outside of that already granted in § 104.  We agree 
with the Navy. 
 
Section 113(h), by its plain text, bars “challenges to 
removal or remedial action selected under section [104] of 
[CERCLA.]”  42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).  Section 104 broadly 
prescribes the applicable response authorities available under 
the statutory scheme.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9604.  Meanwhile, 
§ 120, which is titled “Federal facilities[,]” describes the 
application of CERCLA’s provisions to federal facilities. 
 
Our analysis of a statute begins, of course, with the 
text.  Haberle, 885 F.3d at 178.  Section 104 states that “the 
President is authorized to act … to remove or arrange for the 
removal of, and provide for the remedial action relating to … 
[a] hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time 
…, or take any other response measure … [he] deems 
necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the 
environment.”  42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).  That authority is 
granted in the broadest terms.  There are a number of 
references to a “facility” or “facilities,” but there is no 
indication that Congress meant to distinguish between federal 
and non-federal facilities, or between Superfund and non-
Superfund sites.  Furthermore, § 101(9) provides a definition 
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of the term “facility” and also fails to distinguish between the 
federal and non-federal, or the Superfund and non-Superfund, 
nature of a site.22  Thus, the text of § 104 authorizes the 
President to take response actions at any facility with respect 
to any hazardous release, including a federal facility listed on 
the NPL. 
 
Section 120, which was added to CERCLA in 1986, 
see Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.), has ever since been a source of 
confusion because of its imprecise language.  It states that 
every “department, agency, and instrumentality of the United 
States … shall be subject to, and comply with, [CERCLA] in 
the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally 
and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including 
liability under section [107] of [the Act].”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 9620(a)(1).  It then provides a number of specific duties and 
                                              
22  Section 101(9) defines “facility” to mean: 
 
(A) any building, structure, installation, 
equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe 
into a sewer or publicly owned treatment 
works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, 
ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, 
rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area 
where a hazardous substance has been 
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or 
otherwise come to be located; but does not 
include any consumer product in consumer use 
or any vessel. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). 
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procedures for the Administrator of the EPA with respect to 
federal facilities.  See generally id. § 9620.  One of the 
subsections of § 120 says that “no authority vested in the 
Administrator under this section may be transferred, by 
executive order of the President or otherwise, to any other 
officer or employee of the United States or to any other 
person.”  Id. § 9620(g).  While that suggests that some 
authority has been granted to the federal government under 
§ 120, that does not mean that the authority is necessarily 
independent from, and did not otherwise already exist in 
some form, under § 104 or some other section of CERCLA.  
Section 120 is best understood as clarifying the application of 
already existing CERCLA authority, like § 104, to federal 
facilities.23 
                                              
23  An executive order from the person authorized to 
act under § 104 – the President of the United States – 
supports that reading.  Specifically, Executive Order 12,580 
demonstrates that the President and his staff thought 
CERCLA conferred authority for him to initiate response 
actions under §§ 104, 113, 117, 119, 121, and 126 of that 
statute, because he delegated the functions vested under those 
provisions to various federal departments and agencies.  
Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923, 2924-25 (Jan. 23, 
1987).  He did not distinguish between federal facilities and 
non-federal facilities in that delegation of authority.  See id. at 
2924 (delegating CERCLA functions in Section 2(e)(1) of the 
Order).  Although the Palmers read Section 2(e)(1) of the 
Order, which is limited to facilities not on the NPL, as 
suggesting that § 104(a) only granted the President authority 
to act with respect to federal facilities not listed on the NPL, 
that is not the most logical reading.  A better reading is that 
the President simply did not delegate the full scope of his 
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 Other courts have similarly concluded that § 120 is not 
an independent and wholly separate grant of authority from 
§ 104 for the cleanup of federal facilities.  In Werlein v. 
United States, the court held that a remedial action at a 
federal facility was taken “under section [104], subject to the 
requirements of section [120].”  746 F. Supp. 887, 892 (D. 
Minn. 1990), vacated in part on other grounds, 793 F. Supp. 
898 (D. Minn. 1992).  It reasoned that § 104(a)(1) grants the 
President response authority, which he delegated in Executive 
Order 12,580 to various agencies, both with respect to private 
land and federal land.  Id. at 891.  The court then explained 
that § 120 “provides a road map for application of CERCLA 
to federal facilities[,]” and that there would be little reason for 
the President to delegate response authority to the Secretary 
of Defense “[i]f section [104] did not apply to federal 
facilities.”  Id. at 891-92.  Although it acknowledged that 
some aspects of § 120 could be read to suggest it was 
providing a “separate and distinct” source of cleanup 
authority for federal facilities, the court said it was better to 
consider § 120 as a mere set of “separate procedures for 
federal facility cleanups[.]”  Id. at 892; see also Heart of Am. 
Nw. v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 820 F. Supp. 1265, 1279 
                                                                                                     
authority in the Order, since NPL sites presumably deserve 
greater attention at the highest levels of government.  That 
reading is supported by Section 2(e)(2) of the Order, which 
reads similarly to Section 2(e)(1), except that it makes no 
reference to whether the federal facility is listed on the NPL.  
See id. at 2924-25.  The Order contemplates that § 104 
included authority to act with respect to federal facilities, both 
NPL and non-NPL. 
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(E.D. Wash. 1993) (holding that an environmental cleanup at 
a federal facility listed on the NPL was conducted under 
§ 104, not § 120).24 
 
Section 120 does create unnecessary tension with a 
logical reading of § 104, but, as we have indicated on 
numerous occasions, CERCLA is not the Mona Lisa of 
statutes.  United States v. Rohm & Hass Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 
1270 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Numerous courts have complained 
about the inartful, confusing, and ambiguous language and 
the absence of useful legislative history [of CERCLA].”), 
overruled on other grounds by United States v. E.I. DuPont 
de Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc); 
Lansford-Coaldale Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 
1221 (3d Cir. 1993) (“CERCLA … [is] notorious for its lack 
of clarity and poor draftsmanship[.]”); United States v. Alcan 
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(“[T]he statute is riddled with inconsistencies and 
redundancies.”).  The tension is not so great as to warrant 
interpreting the statutory scheme in a manner that contravenes 
the likely intent of Congress.  Adopting the Palmers’ 
interpretation of CERCLA would lead to the odd result that 
litigants could not challenge ongoing cleanup work at private 
                                              
24  We recognize, however, that not every court agrees 
with that conclusion.  In Fort Ord Toxics Project, Inc. v. 
California E.P.A., the Ninth Circuit held that, while 
“troubling[,]” it is “most reasonable” to interpret §§ 104 and 
120 as separate grants of authority.  189 F.3d 828, 832 (9th 
Cir. 1999).  We are not persuaded by that interpretation, and 
it is notable that no other circuit court has adopted Ford Ord’s 
reasoning. 
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facilities but they could run rampant with challenges to the 
same at federal Superfund sites. 
 
We therefore agree with the District Court that the 
EPA’s cleanup efforts at the Naval Facilities have been 
undertaken pursuant to § 104, subject to the requirements of 
§ 120.25 
 
B. Sovereign Immunity 
The Navy argues that even if the Giovannis’ and 
Palmers’ claims are not barred as challenges to ongoing 
response actions that they must nevertheless fail because of 
the government’s sovereign immunity.  “As a sovereign, the 
United States is immune from suit unless it consents to be 
sued.”  White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 
(3d Cir. 2010).  “Its consent to be sued must be 
‘unequivocally expressed,’ and the terms of such consent 
define the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”  Id. (quoting 
                                              
25  The parties dispute whether the District Court was 
required to remand the claims to state court.  Because we 
have concluded that § 113(h) does not bar the medical 
monitoring claims, there is federal jurisdiction over those 
claims and remand to state court is unnecessary.  Section 
113(h) did not bar filing those claims initially in state court.  
Nor did § 113(b), because the claims arise under state law, 
not CERCLA.  We will, however, affirm the District Court’s 
decision to dismiss the demands for a health effects study 
because those demands constitute challenges to the Navy’s 
ongoing cleanup, and thus neither we nor the state courts have 
jurisdiction to consider those claims at this time. 
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United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)).  
Importantly, even when there is a statutory waiver of 
immunity, “[w]e should not take it upon ourselves to extend 
the waiver beyond that which Congress intended.”  Id. 
(quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 
(1979)).  The Giovannis and Palmers contend that the Navy, 
as an agency of the United States, has waived its sovereign 
immunity pursuant to § 6001(a) of RCRA and pursuant to 
§ 120(a)(1) of CERCLA.  The Navy disagrees, and argues 
that there is no unequivocal waiver of its sovereign immunity.  
We think the Giovannis and Palmers have the better of the 
argument because § 6001(a) of RCRA unequivocally waives 
sovereign immunity to state law claims for injunctive relief.26 
                                              
 26  The Navy did not, however, waive its sovereign 
immunity under § 120(a)(1) of CERCLA.  That provision 
states that “[e]ach department, agency, and instrumentality of 
the United States … shall be subject to, and comply with, 
[CERCLA] in the same manner and to the same extent, both 
procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental 
entity[.]”  42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1).  Another subsection, 
however, says that “[s]tate laws concerning removal and 
remedial action, including State laws regarding enforcement, 
shall apply to removal and remedial action at facilities owned 
or operated by a department, agency, or instrumentality of the 
United States or facilities that are the subject of a deferral 
under subsection (h)(3)(C) of this section when such facilities 
are not included on the National Priorities List.”  Id. 
§ 9620(a)(4) (emphasis added).  The Naval Facilities are 
listed on the NPL, and thus the federal government has not 
exposed itself to liability under state law as it relates to its 
response efforts at those sites.  See Warminster Twp. Mun. 
Auth. v. United States, 903 F. Supp. 847, 850 (E.D. Pa. 1995) 
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Section 6001(a) of RCRA provides that each 
department or agency of the federal government dealing with 
solid or hazardous wastes “shall be subject to, and comply 
with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, 
both substantive and procedural[.]”  It goes on to state that 
“[t]he Federal, State, interstate, and local substantive and 
procedure requirements referred to in this subsection include, 
but are not limited to, all administrative orders and all civil 
and administrative penalties and fines[.]”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 6961(a).  Moreover, it provides that “[t]he United States 
hereby expressly waives any immunity otherwise applicable 
to the United States with respect to any substantive or 
procedural requirement (including, but not limited to, any 
injunctive relief, administrative order or civil or 
administrative penalty or fine …).”  Id.  That waiver is wordy 
but the upshot is that the United States has surrendered its 
immunity with respect to the enforcement of federal, state, 
and local environmental laws due to contamination at the 
hands of the government, when such enforcement involves 
injunctive relief.  Id.  The RCRA waiver does not, however, 
suggest that the government has waived its sovereign 
immunity for suits by private parties for money damages.  
The question thus becomes whether a medical monitoring 
claim is more appropriately classified as a request for money 
damages or for injunctive relief. 
 
The Giovannis and Palmers characterize their 
requested relief as an injunction ordering the Navy to fund a 
trust fund that will pay for private party medical monitoring.  
                                                                                                     
(“[T]he waiver of sovereign immunity described in CERCLA 
cannot operate to expose the Government to liability under 
the HSCA [for facilities on the NPL].”). 
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That led the District Court to logically concluded that the 
Giovannis and Palmers lawsuits sought “injunctive relief to 
compel medical monitoring[.]”  (G.J.A. at 112.)  Although the 
case law on that issue is less than clear, we think the better 
approach on this record is to classify the relief as injunctive. 
 
The characterization of medical monitoring appears to 
come up most often in mass exposure cases where putative 
class plaintiffs seek certification of an injunctive relief class 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).  See, e.g., 
Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(addressing putative Rule 23(b)(2) class seeking costs for 
medical monitoring); Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 
127, 142 (3d Cir. 1998) (same).  In that context, we have 
acknowledged that “[m]edical monitoring cannot be easily 
categorized as injunctive or monetary relief,” Gates, 655 F.3d 
at 262, but have not squarely resolved the issue, see, e.g., id. 
at 263 (declining to reach issue because the district court 
denied class certification “for reasons unrelated to the 
injunctive or monetary nature of the relief sought”).  See also 
Barnes, 161 F.3d at 151 (recognizing that medical monitoring 
claims can be brought “at law or in equity depending on the 
type of relief sought”). 
 
We have also said that “[i]f plaintiffs seek relief that is 
a disguised request for compensatory damages, then the 
medical monitoring claim can only be characterized as a 
claim for monetary damages.”  Id. (quoting Arch v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., Inc., 175 F.R.D. 469, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1997)).  “A 
plaintiff cannot transform a claim for damages into an 
equitable action by asking for an injunction that orders the 
payment of money.”  Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 
715 (3d Cir. 1979).  On the other hand, “if plaintiffs seek the 
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establishment of a court-supervised medical monitoring 
program through which the class members will receive 
periodic medical examinations, then plaintiffs’ medical 
monitoring claims can properly be characterized as a claim 
seeking injunctive relief.”  Barnes, 161 F.3d at 151 (quoting 
Arch, 175 F.R.D. at 483).  Under those circumstances, “the 
creation of [an] expense does not necessarily remove a form 
of relief from the category of equitable remedies.”  Jaffee, 
592 F.2d at 715.  Therefore, whether a medical monitoring 
claim is a request for a legal remedy or one for equitable 
relief requires a case-specific analysis. 
 
 Here, we are faced with a request for medical 
monitoring under HSCA.  We have noted that, in Redland 
Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, “[t]he 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has endorsed awarding medical 
monitoring damages as a trust fund which ‘compensates the 
plaintiff for only the monitoring costs actually incurred.’”  
Gates, 655 F.3d at 263 (quoting Redland Soccer, 696 A.2d 
137, 142 (Pa. 1997)).  That Court expressly recognized the 
availability of medical monitoring relief in a claim under 
HSCA.  696 A.2d at 142.  It characterized the plaintiffs in that 
case as having “requested equitable relief ... in the form of a 
medical monitoring trust fund[.]”  Id.  It then explained that 
the relief available for such a claim was the creation of a trust 
fund through its equitable powers, not a lump sum award of 
damages:  
 
A claim for a medical monitoring trust fund is 
significantly different from a claim for a lump 
sum award of damages.  A trust fund 
compensates the plaintiff for only the 
monitoring costs actually incurred.  In contrast, 
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a lump sum award of damages is exactly that, a 
monetary award that the plaintiff can spend as 
he or she sees fit.  Various courts have 
advocated the trust fund approach instead of the 
lump sum approach. 
Id. at 142 n.6 (citations omitted). 
 
 That case is not the only one in which a state high 
court concluded that the type of medical monitoring costs 
sought here is best characterized as injunctive relief.  The 
New Jersey and Maryland Supreme Courts also agree.  See 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Albright, 71 A.3d 30, 80 (Md. 2013) 
(“We note with approval the recent tendency of many courts 
that award medical monitoring costs to do so by establishing 
equitably a court-supervised fund, administered by a trustee, 
at the expense of the defendant.”); Ayers v. Township of 
Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 314 (N.J. 1987) (“In our view, the use 
of a court-supervised fund to administer medical-surveillance 
payments in mass exposure cases … is a highly appropriate 
exercise of the Court’s equitable powers.”). 
 
 The United States Supreme Court likewise appears to 
agree that a medical monitoring claim can be something other 
than a claim for money damages.  In Metro-North Commuter 
Railroad Company v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997), a 
railroad worker had brought suit under the Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) as a result of asbestos 
exposure.  Id. at 427.  The worker, who was asymptomatic, 
had sought a lump-sum damages award for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and for a related medical 
monitoring claim.  Id. at 426-27.  The district court dismissed 
the FELA claim because the worker had not shown evidence 
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of actual physical harm, and the court declined to address the 
medical monitoring claim.  Id. at 428.  The Second Circuit 
reversed, permitting the medical monitoring claim to proceed.  
Id. at 438-39.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and in 
turn reversed the Second Circuit. 
 
 The Supreme Court interpreted the Second Circuit’s 
opinion as adopting the idea “that medical monitoring costs 
themselves represent a separate negligently caused economic 
‘injury[]’ … permitting (as tort law ordinarily permits) the 
recovery of medical cost damages in the form of a lump 
sum[.]”  Id. at 439.  With no FELA case law on point, the 
Supreme Court “canvassed the state-law cases that have 
considered whether the negligent causation of this kind of 
harm (i.e., causing a plaintiff, through negligent exposure to a 
toxic substance, to incur medical monitoring costs) by itself 
constitutes a sufficient basis for a tort recovery.”  Id. at 440.  
The Court described that body of law as revealing “that the 
cases authorizing recovery for medical monitoring in the 
absence of physical injury do not endorse a full-blown, 
traditional tort law case of action for lump-sum damages[.]”  
Id.  “Rather,” the Court observed, “those courts, while 
recognizing that medical monitoring costs can amount to a 
harm that justifies a tort remedy, have suggested, or imposed, 
special limitations on that remedy.”  Id. at 440-41.  The Court 
explained that the New Jersey Supreme Court had 
“recommend[ed] in future cases [the] creation of ‘a court-
supervised fund to administer medical-surveillance 
payments[.]’”  Id. at 441 (quoting Ayers, 525 A.3d at 314).  
The Supreme Court characterized the Second Circuit’s 
adoption of a lump-sum damages award for medical 
monitoring costs as “beyond the bounds of currently evolving 
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common law.”  Id. at 440 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
 
 As it relates to the Giovannis’ and Palmers’ medical 
monitoring claims under HSCA, we now join those courts 
that have characterized that type of relief as primarily 
equitable in nature.  The Giovannis’ and Palmers’ medical 
monitoring claims do not seek a lump sum of money to 
compensate them for past harm.  Rather, those claims seek an 
order requiring the Navy to fund a trust that will cover a 
prospective private party medical monitoring program.  That 
the Navy will have to expend money does not, in itself, make 
the desired relief a demand for money damages.  Jaffee, 592 
F.2d at 715.  We therefore conclude that the Giovannis’ and 
Palmers’ medical monitoring claims are best understood as 
requests for injunctive relief.27 
 
Because RCRA waives sovereign immunity to claims 
for injunctive relief, the Navy is not immune from suit for the 
costs of private party medical monitoring.  Accordingly, those 
claims may proceed. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
vacate and remand in part the orders of dismissal. 
 
                                              
27  Our analysis is limited to characterizing claims for 
private party medical monitoring under HSCA for purposes 
of the RCRA waiver of sovereign immunity.  We do not 
decide today how to characterize claims for relief outside 
those limited circumstances. 
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BIBAS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment. 
I agree with the majority that the government took its re-
sponse actions at Navy facilities under § 9604, so I join part 
III.A.4 of the majority opinion. I also join part III.B because I 
agree with the limited holding that RCRA’s sovereign-immun-
ity waiver does not bar claims that seek a medical-monitoring 
trust fund. See Maj. Op. at 55 n.27. So I concur in the judgment. 
But I would adopt the D.C. Circuit’s definition of a forbid-
den “challenge,” limiting it to actions that would interfere with 
a cleanup. At root, I disagree that who does an action bears on 
whether that action meets CERCLA’s definitions of “removal” 
or “remedial.” In other words, I am unpersuaded by the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Hanford. While that opinion relies on leg-
islative history and remedial purpose, I would stick to the stat-
utory text. At the very least, we should adopt a single workable 
test to determine what are challenges barred by § 9613(h). 
Under the correct test, neither medical monitoring nor 
health assessments qualify as “challenges to removal or reme-
dial action[s].” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). I agree with the majority 
that private medical monitoring is not a challenge. But my con-
clusion would not change if the plaintiffs sought medical mon-
itoring by the government. The same is true for health assess-
ments. 
I. WE SHOULD ADOPT THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S 
INTERFERENCE TEST 
To determine what a forbidden “challenge” is, the majority 
takes a “holistic approach.” Maj. Op. at 20. It addresses each 
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of our sister circuits’ varied tests and applies them all. But 
adopting divergent tests leaves district courts without a work-
able framework. Instead, we should distill the various tests into 
a single one. The D.C. Circuit has already done that work for 
us in El Paso Natural Gas, 750 F.3d at 880. 
Adopting the other circuits’ differing tests could produce 
divergent results. This case illustrates the point. The Giovan-
nis’ and Palmers’ health-assessment claims are unlikely to call 
the remedial plan “into question.” Broward, 311 F.3d at 1073. 
And arguably it would not “interfere with the implementation 
of a CERCLA remedy” by “ ‘impact[ing] the [removal] action 
selected.’ ” Cannon, 538 F.3d at 1335 (quoting Broward, 311 
F.3d at 1072). At most, health assessments could later prompt 
the EPA to take extra response actions if the health assessment 
revealed a significant risk. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(11). But layer-
ing new health measures, or even extra cleanup efforts, on top 
of an existing plan is not the same as challenging the measures 
already selected. On the other hand, a health assessment is “re-
lated to the goals of cleanup.” Razore, 66 F.3d at 239. Still, the 
majority relies on all three of those opinions, plus El Paso. Maj. 
Op. at 16-17. I do not know how district courts will untangle 
this web. 
Instead, I would adopt El Paso’s interference test. The D.C. 
Circuit nicely synthesized our sister circuits’ varied tests into a 
single framework: a claim is a challenge under § 9613(h) “if it 
will interfere with a ‘removal’ or a ‘remedial action.’ ” El Paso, 
750 F.3d at 880 (emphasis in original) (discussing Cannon and 
Broward, among other cases). In close cases, courts must 
gauge how closely “the suit [relates to] the CERCLA cleanup: 
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the more closely related, the clearer it will be that the suit is a 
‘challenge.’ ” Id. And the Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits agree 
that the statutory requirement of a “challenge” means “inter-
ference” or something very close to it. El Paso, 750 F.3d at 
880; Cannon, 538 F.3d at 1335; see also Razore, 66 F.3d at 
239-40 (finding “interfere[nce]” because the requested reme-
dies could have “halted [cleanup efforts] for ‘days or weeks’ ”). 
I would simply add that “interfere” should carry its ordinary 
meaning: to “obstruct[ ]  or hind[er].” Interference, Black’s 
Law Dictionary 831 (8th ed. 2004). 
II. MEDICAL MONITORING IS NOT A RESPONSE ACTION 
The majority artfully explains why private medical moni-
toring is neither a removal nor a remedial action. But I see no 
reason why the quality of the action changes simply because 
the actor is the government. 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Hanford, relied on by the 
majority, is unpersuasive. Maj. Op. at 27-29. There, the Ninth 
Circuit resorted too quickly to CERCLA’s legislative history 
and remedial purpose. 71 F.3d at 1478-81. But CERCLA does 
not distinguish governmental actors from private ones; the rel-
evant provisions say nothing about who does the cleanup. As 
the majority notes, the law “gives ‘the President broad power 
to command government agencies and private parties to clean 
up hazardous waste sites.’ ” Maj. Op. at 14 (quoting Key Tronic 
Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994)). And the def-
initions of “removal” and “remedial action[s]” are keyed to ac-
tions, not actors. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (listing “actions” that 
may need to be taken to “cleanup or remov[e] released hazard-
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ous substances”) (emphasis added); id. § 9601(24) (“[R]eme-
dial action means those actions consistent with permanent 
remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted and emphases added). 
Given the statutory text’s explicit focus on actions, not ac-
tors, I find Hanford’s focus on legislative history and purpose 
unpersuasive. So I would hold that § 9613(h) does not bar a suit 
seeking medical monitoring as “challenges to removal or re-
medial action.” 
III. NOR ARE HEALTH ASSESSMENTS RESPONSE ACTIONS 
Nor does government involvement turn health assessments 
into removal or remedial actions. CERCLA explicitly distin-
guishes health assessments from response actions. The statute 
allows recovery of  
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action in-
curred by the United States Government or a 
State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the 
national contingency plan; 
(B) any other necessary costs of response in-
curred by any other person consistent with the 
national contingency plan; 
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss 
of natural resources, including the reasonable 
costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or 
loss resulting from such a release; and 
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(D) the costs of any health assessment or health 
effects study carried out under section 9604(i) of 
this title. 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (emphases added). Since the statute 
enumerates response actions separately from health assess-
ments, the two are distinct. Any other reading renders 
§ 9607(a)(4)(D) superfluous. 
And subparagraph (D) was added later than (A) and (B). 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 107, 100 Stat. 1613. In fact, Congress 
added subparagraph (D) at the same time that it created the 
ATSDR and provided for medical monitoring and health as-
sessments. Id. §§ 107, 110. If health assessments were removal 
or remedial actions, then they would already have been cov-
ered by § 9607(a)(4)(A) and (B). But health assessments were 
not, so Congress added § 9607(a)(4)(D). I would give full ef-
fect to that addition. 
True, there is a colorable argument that the definition of a 
health assessment falls within the definition of a removal ac-
tion. Health assessments examine “the potential risk to human 
health posed by individual sites and facilities.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9604(i)(6)(F). That sounds a lot like “assess[ing], and eval-
uat[ing] the release” of, hazardous substances. Id. § 9601(23) 
(defining removal actions). Still, health assessments are unlike 
the other temporary measures listed in the definition of re-
moval actions, like providing security fencing or monitoring 
the release of hazardous substances. They are not done at the 
cleanup site itself. And the enumeration of health assessments 
as distinct from removal actions in § 9607(a)(4) resolves any 
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doubt. So I would hold that health assessments are neither re-
moval nor remedial actions. 
Nor would a health assessment interfere with any response 
action. On this record, I do not see how a health assessment 
would obstruct or hinder any ongoing cleanup. Sure, it might 
require the EPA to take more action if the assessment revealed 
a significant risk. Id. § 9604(i)(11). And those extra actions 
might include “provi[ding] alternative water supplies, tempo-
rary evacuation and housing,” all of which are listed removal 
actions. Id. § 9604(23). But a health assessment is upstream 
from a response action. We lack jurisdiction over challenges to 
response actions only if they have been “selected.” Id. 
§ 9613(h). But while an assessment may require new response 
actions, it is not an attack on the response itself. 
* * * * * 
In short, § 9613(h) turns on whether the action would inter-
fere with a removal or remedial action, not whether the actor 
is the government. Neither medical monitoring nor health as-
sessments would interfere with an ongoing cleanup. So I would 
hold that neither kind of requested relief turns a suit into a chal-
lenge.  
I agree with the majority that the court-supervised medical 
monitoring sought here is not a challenge and is not barred by 
sovereign immunity, so I concur in part and in the judgment. 
Because the majority finds that government-led health assess-
ments are challenges barred by § 9613(h), it does not address 
whether sovereign immunity would bar those claims. So I too 
decline to reach that question. 
